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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
ing that the company did not intend to rely on the clause. Grant-
ing that the offer might have led the insured so to believe, such
a belief, coming months after the period had expired, could
hardly have been prejudicial.
Co-insurance clauses are not valid in Louisiana unless the
particular clause has been approved by the fire insurance divi-
sion and a consideration allowed in the rate of premium charged,
and then to be effective there must be stamped on the face and
back of the policy a statement showing that the policy is issued
subject to the conditions of the attached co-insurance clause. 4 In
Jonesboro Lodge No. 280 of Free and Accepted Masons v. Ameri-
can Central Insurance Company5 the court refused to enforce
such -a clause on the ground that the required notice was not
clearly stamped on the face of the policy. The court permitted
recovery of a twelve per cent penalty, refusing to apply the pro-
visions of the Insurance Code,6 which became effective subse-
quent to the occurrence of the loss and tender by the insurer.
Under the Insurance Code the company's failure to pay must now
be arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause to justify
imposition of the penalty.
Only a question of evidence was involved in Picone v. Marine
Fire Insurance Company of New York 7 and this was resolved
against the insurer. The facts were adequate in support of the
court's opinion.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
Since the case of Arnold v. Sun Oil Company' had been in
court for some five years, it was decided on rehearing not to
remand for elicitation of further facts concerning possession and
prescription. The court held that a. mineral lessee does not
acquire the right of reliance upon the public records by virtue of
Act 205 of 19382 because this statute is merely procedural, and
does not alter the substantive nature of the lease, under the
articles of the civil code. Therefore, mineral lessees may not "by
4. La. R.S. (1950) 22:694.
5. 218 La. 403, 49 So. 2d 740 (1950).
6. La. Act 195 of 1948.
7. 218 La. 546, 50 So. 2d 188 (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1949) (on rehearing 1950).
2. See La. Act 6 of 1950 (2 E.S.), amending to include substantive rights.
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reliance upon the public records, acquire a greater right than an
ordinary lessee could acquire and a greater right, in fact, than
their lessor possessed." Even if the mineral lessee had been
entitled to rely upon the public records, they showed in this
instance that his lessor had a defective title.
Walter v. Midstates Oil Corporation4 is concerned with inter-
pretation of a lease in regard to conditional overriding royalty
payment, whether lessor or lessee should pay certain amounts of
severance tax, et cetera. No useful purpose would be served in
setting forth the instruments involved here. Prevailing rules and
customs of the oil industry were used to guide interpretation of
certain clauses.5
Accepted principles of servitude are reiterated in Starr Davis
Oil Company, Incorporated v. Webber,6 wherein it was held that
a mineral servitude owner entitled to search the land and keep
one-half of what he found and the landowner entitled to the other
half of the minerals are not co-owners of the minerals, and hence
the action for partition does not lie.
LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Company7 reaffirmed the
decision of Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company8 in a similar
factual situation, and held that "production in paying quantities
during the primary term of a mineral lease on a portion of an
integrated pooling unit established by the Commissioner of Con-
servation, although not on the leased property, maintains the
lease in effect beyond the primary term as to that part of the
leased land lying outside the unit ..... 9 The decision was again
grounded on indivisibility of the lease contract, against which it
was indicated the parties might have contracted. The plea for
cancellation for lack of proper development was denied because
the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient proof and because the
lessee had not been placed in default. Justice Hamiter did not
concur on the grounds so ably expressed in his dissenting opinion
in Hunter Company v. Shell Oil Company, Incorporated.0
On rehearing in Sanders v. Flowers," it was decided that the
3. 218 La. 50, 150, 48 So. 2d 369, 403 (1949).
4. 218 La. 179, 48 So. 2d 648 (1950).
5. 218 La. 179, 191, 48 So. 2d 648, 652 (1950).
6. 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950).
7. 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
8. 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
9. 218 La. 463, 469, 49 So. 2d 855, 857 (1950).
10. 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
11. 218 La. 472, 49 So. 2d 858 (1950),
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Commissioner of Conservation was not a necessary party to this
suit, wherein the commissioner's order to unitize was attacked
by one claiming that he had no notice of the hearing called by the
commissioner. The court found further that the plaintiff, having
but a reversionary interest in the minerals involved, had no right
to question the order. Moreover, the method of notice being
within the discretion of the commissioner and publication having
been proved, his duty had been fulfilled. In the per curiam, it is
observed that the case did not necessitate a ruling on whether the
order of the commissioner suspended prescription or whether the
successful drilling on the unit in which the defendant's property
was included interrupted prescription, as the court found that
prescription had not run on the servitude on other grounds.
In Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Company,'12 in accord with
established jurisprudence, a contract providing for royalty in lieu
of drilling within the primary term and in lieu of an offset well
was held to have been fulfilled rather than breached under uniti-
zation orders of the State Commissioner of Conservation. A
clause of the contract providing for a bonus in oil was held to
mean at market price without deduction for severance tax.
In Haynes v. King 3 on first hearing it was held that a paper
labelled "Declaration of Interest," confected by the landowner
and one-time servitude owners after the mineral servitudes had
prescribed and recorded only after sale of the land to plaintiff,
was a tacit renunciation of prescription by the landowner giving
a new ten year term and that recordation of the original servitude
was sufficient notice to plaintiff, purchaser, because the burden
was then on the buyer to find out whether prescription on the
servitude had been suspended or interrupted or renounced. The
Chief Justice strongly dissented, and on rehearing the court held
that a renunciation, if possible at all, was equivalent to a new
agreement or grant of servitude and obviously must be recorded
to affect third parties with or without actual knowledge. Justice
Hamiter dissented, adhering to his majority opinion on the first
hearing and again voicing his dissatisfaction with application of
servitude principles to mineral rights, in any case.
Bond v. Midstates Oil Corporation4 held that when overrid-
ing royalty, which is considered as rent under Louisiana juris-
prudence, is retained in disposing of an interest in a mineral
12. 218 La. 835, 51 So. 2d 87 (1950).
13. 219 La. 160, 52 So. 2d 531 (1950).
14. 219 La, 415, 53 So. 2d 149 (1951).
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lease, a sublease and not an assignment has been confected,
regardless of other provisions in the instrument purporting to
relinquish control to the transferee. Thus, the criteria of Stacy
v. Midstates Oil Corporation15 in the original hearing on excep-
tions did not stand.
A great deal of evidence was examined in Texas Company v.
Leach, 16 and the court found that the lessors desiring cancellation
had not sustained their burden of proof of breach. The court
refused to insert the word uninterruptedly into a phrase of the
lease calling merely for continued production.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Most of the decisions in the field of family law were on sep-
aration, divorce, and alimony issues. None is of great importance.
A few involved questions of fact only, such as whether the alleged
grounds for separation' or divorce 2 were indicated by the evi-
dence, or whether the changed circumstances of the parties war-
ranted a decrease in alimony previously allowed.3 Some applied
previously accepted interpretations of law. Thus "cruelty" again
was said to include the wilful refusal of the husband to provide
a home for his wife separate and apart from that of his family
who mistreat her.4 Act 24 of 1930 (now Revised Statutes 13:4452),
which limits to thirty days the time for appeal from separation
and divorce judgments, again was interpreted not to apply to
appeals from those parts of separation or divorce judgments not
pertaining to the separation or divorce issue proper.5 The wife's
right to alimony pendente lite regardless of the outcome of the
suit for separation or divorce was reemphasized." And, finally,
15. 214 La. 173, 36 So. 2d 714 (1947).
16. 219 La. 613, 53 So. 2d 786 (1951).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Pugh v. Pugh, 218 La. 395, 49 So. 2d 738 (1950).
2. Creel v. Creel, 218 La. 382, 49 So. 2d 617 (1950) and Savin v. Savin, 218
La. 754, 57 So. 2d 41 (1951).
3. Graham v. Graham, 218 La. 928, 51 So. 2d 392 (1951).
4. Bonvillion v. Papa, 218 La. 203, 48 So. 2d 897 (1950). See the previous
decision in Cormier v. Cormier, 193 La. 158, 190 So. 365 (1939) and the cases
therein cited.
5. Scott v. Scott, 218 La. 211, 48 So. 2d 899 (1950), involving an appeal from
the alimony portion of the decree. See also Cressione v. Millet, 212 La. 691,
33 So. 2d 198 (1947) and Cure v. Tobin, 217 La. 713, 47 So. 2d 329 (1950) (cus-
tody and community property aspects of the decree granting the divorce or
separation).
6. St. Martin v. Messersmith, 218 La. 239, 48 So. 2d 909 (1950).
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